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Abstract 
This paper expands traditional predatory theory approaches to state fiscal capacity by adopting 
spatial analytical reasoning and methods.  While previous work in the predatory theory tradition 
has often incorporated interdependent external influences, such as war and trade, it has often 
done so in a way that maintains a theoretical and empirical autonomy of the state.  Theoretically, 
we suggest four mechanisms (coercion, competition, learning, and emulation) that operate to 
channel information through interstate rivalry and territorial contiguity, trade networks, and the 
political space associated with regime type and intergovernmental organization membership.  We 
test our predictions using a multi-parametric spatio-temporal autoregressive model with four 
spatial lags capturing the four mechanisms.  Our empirical results provide support for the 
coercion and learning mechanisms.   
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Introduction 
 In his description of the development of the English state in the 17
th
 Century, John 
Brewer (1989) refers to revenues as the “sinews of power.”  This corporeal metaphor reinforces 
our traditional conception of the state as an organism/organization that is self-contained, 
autonomous and sovereign.  Much of the literature on state development has developed in a 
similar way, though often incorporating external influences, such as war and trade.  Yet, while 
our theories of state building expect external influences on state capacity, our modeling of such 
factors has not caught up.  Theoretical models treat war and trade as traits of the individual state 
under observation, and empirical models follow suit.  What if the sinews of power are conceived 
of as part of larger webs of connections emanating from within and without of the state?   In this 
paper, we attempt to theoretically and empirically refine the dominant approach to state capacity; 
namely, predatory theory through an application of spatial analytical reasoning and empirical 
testing. 
 We argue that while state fiscal capacity may be in large measure shaped by domestic 
processes, we can also theorize and more accurately observe international influences as well.  
Theoretically, we argue that four main mechanisms affect state fiscal capacity, including 
coercion, competition, learning, and emulation.  These mechanisms, already highlighted in the 
diffusion literature, provide channels through which state and non-state actors such as 
multinational corporations (MNCs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) affect revenue 
extraction policies and outcomes throughout the world.  In particular, we believe that coercion 
works primarily through interstate rivalry and territorial contiguity—already a mainstay of the 
literature, but tested in a novel way in this paper.  Competition occurs through trade networks, as 
governments must compete through tax policy adjustments to secure flows of production and 
4 
 
export market share. Learning is thought to occur through membership in IGOs.  IGOs provide 
policy models for their members based on evidence, shared beliefs and norms, that changes 
beliefs and gives greater confidence in a policy in the adopting state.  Finally, emulation occurs 
through regime type, particularly as democracies turn to each other for lessons learned on the 
legitimacy of bargains struck between the government and the people over taxation and service 
delivery. These four mechanisms, and their observable channels, are one way to move forward 
the predatory theory of the state and associated quantitative tests. 
 We evaluate the four competing causal mechanisms using a multi-parametric spatio-
temporal autoregressive model (m-STAR) that captures the spatial effects of interstate rivalry 
and geographic contiguity, trade, membership in economic IGOs, and regime similarity using 
spatial lags.  In contrast to more traditional modeling approaches, the spatial lags approach 
allows for a simultaneous modeling of both domestic-level effects, such as GDP per capita or the 
level of agricultural development, as well as spatial effects, such as the spill-over effects from 
geographical neighbors or trade partners.  The spatial effects act as feedback loops, through 
which the dependent variable—state i's fiscal capacity at time t—is affected by its own fiscal 
capacity in the previous period 1t  , as well as the fiscal capacity in neighboring units at time t.  
This means that a change in state i's level of tax extraction does not only affect state i's own level 
of tax extraction in the next time period, but also has potential implications for the level of tax 
extraction of i's geographical neighbors, interstate rivals, trade partners, IGO partners, and states 
with similar regimes.  Our empirical results provide support for the coercion and learning 
mechanisms.  Namely, we find evidence of a positive relationship between state's extractive 
capacity and the average extractive capacity of its geographical neighbors.  We also find that a 
state's fiscal capacity is positively affected by that of others with whom it shares memberships in 
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economic IGOs.  The results show no support for the remaining two remaining mechanisms of 
competition and emulation.   
 
The Sources of State Fiscal Capacity 
 States are a product of their revenue generating abilities, thus a long line of scholarship 
has devoted attention to the internal and external sources of variation in fiscal capacity. As Levi 
(1988: 1) notes, ‘the history of state revenue production is the history of the evolution of the 
state’. Levi, and others, such as North (1981), Tilly (1975, 1985), and Olson (1993) are variously 
described as developing predatory theory, fiscal contract theory, or even bellicist theory.  The 
particular label attached to this work usually highlights one aspect of the process of revenue 
extraction, such as the implied exchange relationship between rulers and the rules in fiscal 
contract theory, or the central importance of war in stimulating extraction in bellicist theory.  In 
general, all of these approaches share a similar view of rulers as predators attempting to 
maximize their revenue extraction from a subject population subject to a variety of constraints, 
such as the ruler’s relative bargaining power, transaction costs, and discount rate.  While much of 
this predatory literature was developed to explain early modern European states, a number of 
scholars have attempted to explore the usefulness of its insights in the contemporary world (e.g., 
Centeno 2002; Herbst 2000; Thies 2004).   
 Drawing upon Levi (1988), Thies (2010) describes the relationship between rulers and 
the ruled in predatory terms for contemporary states.  First, he notes that rulers will have 
increased bargaining power relative to the subject population the greater their monopolization of 
coercive, economic, and political resources. Rulers therefore attempt to monopolize the means of 
violence in the territorial areas under their jurisdiction.  Of course, this is one of the issues that 
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many post-colonial states now deal with on a regular basis—how to contain a variety of internal 
rivals to the government, and often how to prevail in full-fledged civil wars through a 
monopolization of coercive power.  The empirical evidence thus far suggests that civil wars and 
most types of internal rivalries lead to a reduction in revenue extraction.  There has been little 
systematic evidence gathered on the effect of efforts to monopolize economic resources on 
extraction.  Thies (2010) demonstrated that contrary to the prevailing view in the literature on 
civil war onset, the state is the main beneficiary of rents and tax revenue from natural resources.  
Only oil, depending on how it was measured, increased the likelihood of civil war onset (see also 
Morrison 2009; Smith 2004).  No one in the predatory literature has focused on restrictions on 
the economy related to extraction per se, or trade for that matter.  Cheibub’s (1998) empirical 
evidence suggests that as levels of trade increase, so do taxation, in part due to reliance on trade 
taxes in many developing countries and as a result of a need to develop social protection 
measures in developed countries.  This result is also found in subsequent studies (e.g., Thies 
2010).   
 While the theoretical story is consistent, the empirical findings regarding the 
monopolization of political resources are mixed.  Olson (1993) suggests that autocrats should 
extract more than their democratic counterparts given his view that democratic transitions occur 
when autocratic succession goes awry due to changes in the balance of power within society.  
Democracies by nature represent a balancing of political resources, rather than a monopolization 
of such resources in the ruler.  Empirically, some analyses have found the expected negative 
relationship between democracy and extraction (e.g., Thies 2006), while others have found a 
positive relationship (e.g., Cheibub 1998; Thies 2004, 2010), others insignificance (Thies 2005, 
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2007), and others find an effect contingent on other aspects of state development (Thies 2009), 
though some of this variation is also clearly driven by the sample of states under consideration. 
 Second, according to Levi, rulers attempt to lower their transaction costs in enforcing 
compliance with their revenue extraction policies.  There are some standard indicators related to 
transaction costs found in most empirical studies, such as per capita income, trade openness, 
inflation, and agriculture as a percentage of GDP. The former two measures are thought to 
increase state revenues since they reduce transaction costs, while the latter two measures 
should reduce revenues since they increase transaction costs (Cheibub, 1998).  However, other 
factors, such as religious and ethnic fractionalization also implicate transaction costs, since 
extraction from homogeneous societies is presumed to be simpler than heterogeneous ones 
(Thies 2010).  In fact, many of the factors discussed as relating to bargaining power (above) and 
discount rates (see below) also implicate transaction costs.  One of the fundamental factors 
underlying transaction costs is the legitimacy of the ruler, which should generally be higher in 
democracies than autocracies. 
 Finally, the discount rates of rulers vary according to the strength of their internal and 
external rivals. External conflict in the form of war, territorial threat or interstate rivalry is often 
argued to loosen the constraints rulers face in raising revenue (e.g. Cohen, Brown and Organski 
1981; North 1981; Tilly 1985; Rasler and Thompson 1985; Campbell 1993; Thies 2004; Thies 
and Sobek 2010). Empirically, however, most studies find a negative relationship between 
interstate war and fiscal capacity (Thies 2005, 2006, 2007; Thies and Sobek 2010).  On the other 
hand, Thies’s modified approach to predatory theory argues that rivalry and ongoing territorial 
threats should provide the state with the ability to run a version of Tilly’s (1975) “protection 
racket,” thus increased extraction moderately.  The evidence from the contemporary developing 
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world seems to confirm this expectation.  Internal conflict in the form of civil war or other types 
of internal rivalry may or may not increase the ruler’s discount rate depending on the strength of 
the challenge (Levi 1988: 33; North 1981: 27), and as previously discussed most of the evidence 
finds a negative relationship between internal rivalry/civil war and extraction (e.g., Thies 2010), 
though Thies (2004) found that internal rivalries characterized by ethnic challenges were 
responsible for increased extraction. 
 There are several avenues to pursue to improve the existing literature.  First, it is focused 
primarily on bargaining pressures within the state, notwithstanding the important role that 
external conflict plays in some of the more bellicist versions of the theory.  We would like to 
push the literature forward to consider some of the mechanisms of diffusion that operate across 
boundaries.  It is quite likely that state fiscal capacity, while largely a function of internal 
processes, is also dependent on international context and events in other states.  While some of 
these factors are often included in statistical models, such as regime type, trade, external threats; 
others are not, such as involvement in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and none are 
probably modeled in a way that demonstrates their full importance to extraction. Second, as 
Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley (2006: 27-28) and Hoff and Ward (2004: 161) note more 
generally about political science research, most statistical analyses assume the independence of 
individual observations even if our theories are implicitly based on interdependence.  As 
Franzese and Hays (2010: 571) put it, “in international relations…the interdependence of states’ 
actions essentially defines the subject.”  However, even work in the bellicist tradition of 
predatory that focuses on war or interstate rivalry using statistical analyses still holds on to the 
individual state as the unit of analysis and does not account for potential spatial dependencies in 
the data.  
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We already know that within states, subnational units engage in strategic behavior about 
taxation, as well as welfare provision and imposition of environmental standards (e.g., Brueckner 
2003; Case and Rosen 1993).  Geys (2006) is practically a subnational version of predatory 
theory in that he considers tax competition in the context of the public goods that citizens 
demand given the taxation/public goods provision in neighboring locales. 
 The rather large literature on interstate tax competition has investigated whether 
competition for mobile factors of production has led to a “race-to-the-bottom.”  The argument is 
that as governments have reduced the restriction on capital mobility, they may be drawn into a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the dominant strategy of each state is to make its market more 
profitable than its neighbors.  This competition could logically lead to the reduction of taxes on 
capital.  It could also lead to reductions in environmental standards, labor market regulations, 
and the like, in the pursuit of truly globalized capital.  It is often assumed that reductions in 
marginal tax rates as a result of a race-to-the-bottom dynamic will translate into lower overall 
government revenues.  However, modeling states as if they were predatory rulers—meaning that 
states prefer higher levels of revenue subject to a variety of constraints—does not rule out the 
possibility they may see reducing marginal tax rates as a means to increase overall revenue.  
Indeed, this is a staple of neoliberal thinking about the relationship between tax rates, economic 
growth, and revenue generation for the state.  What is most important for our purposes is the 
notion that states will look to see what other states are doing on tax rates when considering 
decisions about their own in order to prevent businesses or individuals from relocating. Despite 
the inconsistent evidence on tax competition, it is clear that governments’ choices about tax 
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policy and extraction more broadly, are interdependent (e.g., Basinger and Hallerberg 2004; 
Franzese and Hays 2007a, 2008; Swank 2006). 
 We also know that a number of “internal” policy decisions affecting revenues and 
expenditures are influenced by diffusion. The literature on the international diffusion of 
liberalism is replete with examples (Simmons et al., 2006). Brooks (2005) has shown that the 
privatization of pensions is influenced by decisions made by relevant peer groups.  Privatization 
schemes are adopted by states that are concerned with the balance of revenue generation and 
future expenditures linked to pension liabilities.  Meseguer (2004) also shows evidence of 
rational learning and emulation in privatization more generally in both the OECD and Latin 
America.  Jahn (2006) analyzed the social expenditures of states as a result of diffusion processes 
associated with globalization.  Lee and Strang (2006) demonstrate downsizing in public sector 
employment in the OECD is a production of both learning and emulation.  Elkins, Guzman and 
Simmons (2006) have tested a variety of diffusion mechanisms related to the signing of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) designed to increase foreign direct investment (FDI).  Economic 
competition seems to have the most significant effect on increasing the likelihood of BITs.  
Further, Simmons and Elkins (2004) demonstrate diffusion via learning for capital account, 
current account and exchange rate policies. 
 Once again, we suggest that neither the tax competition, nor the diffusion of liberalism 
literature necessarily implies only a diminution of state fiscal capacity.  In fact, liberalism 
supplies the logic for why reduced tax rates may still produce comparable or even increased 
revenue for the state.  If reduced tax rates (tax competition literature) or reduced 
regulation/government interference in the economy (diffusion of liberalism literature) free 
individuals and business to divert their energies to productive uses, then the economy should 
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grow, providing a larger tax base.  Even at lower rates, the amount of government revenue may 
stay the same or even increase.  As we know, neoliberal policies were pushed around the world 
by the IMF and World Bank to get governments out of the economy, which they argued would 
ultimately improve governments’ revenue positions. 
 We could situate all of this work within Lazer’s (2005) approach to regulatory capitalism 
as a kind of informational network.  States in such a network are either policy choosers or 
information producers.  The informational spillovers created by some states leads to the kind of 
diffusion we see in areas like pension privatization, welfare policy, taxation and the like.  
Epistemic communities, international organizations, cross-national corporate entities, 
institutionally mediated networks, and interpersonal networks all become mechanisms for the 
transmission of information.  This reorientation of what has previously been thought of as 
separate national decisions into a larger framework of diffusion is a useful wake-up call to the 
predatory literature, which is still beholden to outdated concepts of immutable state sovereignty.  
We attempt to draw upon these insights to push the literature forward on state fiscal capacity by 
considering the mechanisms whereby diffusion of information affects ruler extractive choices 
and abilities.  
  
Mechanisms of International Influence 
 Like many previous studies, we seek to incorporate, but also move beyond the tradit ional 
geographic realm of space to consider other types of space (Anselin 2003).  As Beck, Gleditsch 
and Beardsley (2006) suggest, “…although ‘nearby’ is usually taken to mean geographical 
closeness, there is no reason why we cannot use any notion of nearness that makes theoretical 
sense.”  These authors include two measures of connectivity in their attempt to model 
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democracy: geographic distance and trade volumes.  We include these measures of connectivity 
that are already common to the predatory literature, and expand to more carefully consider the 
contested role of regime type and membership in common international organizations.  We 
suggested that each of these types of space represent an opportunity for diffusion of information 
via a number of mechanisms. 
 Like Brinks and Coppedge (2006: 468), we follow Rogers (1995) who defines diffusion 
as “the process by which [1] an innovation is [2] communicated through certain channels [3] 
over time among the members of [4] a social system.” First, the innovation that concerns us is 
information, models and practices related to more efficient revenue extraction.  Second, the 
channel of communication will come through a variety of state and non-state (corporations, IOs) 
actors as described in more detail below. While we do not observe this communication directly, 
we will identify specific mechanisms that serve to channel communication from one state to 
another.  Third, while some innovations will move quickly via the following mechanisms, others 
may move more slowly.  We examine the timing of these changes closely in the empirical 
analysis.  Fourth, the social system in this context is a network of countries. Some of these 
networks are based on physical proximity, but others related to cultural, economic and political 
ties. 
 The literature on diffusion has already identified a number of mechanisms operating in 
the international social system of states.  For example, Elkins and Simmons (2005: 35) classify 
diffusion mechanisms “as one of two kinds: those for which another’s adoption alters the value 
of the practice and those for which another’s adoption imparts information. Each of these two 
broad classes, adaptation to altered conditions and learning, comprises a set of varied 
mechanisms (38-39).”  The former includes mechanisms like cultural norms, support groups and 
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competition, while the latter involves three methods of learning, namely information cascades, 
availability and reference groups.  Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006) identify four 
mechanisms responsible for diffusion of economic and political liberalism: coercion, 
competition, learning and emulation.  Franzese and Hays (2008: 745) reiterate Simmons, Dobbin 
and Garrett’s four mechanisms and add a fifth: migration. 
 In our reconceptualization of the external dimension of predatory theory, we focus on 
these mechanisms that may affect state fiscal capacity: coercion, competition, learning, and 
emulation.
4
  The primary mechanism that we might identify from bellicist strands of predatory 
theory is coercion.  Rulers compete with other rulers for subject populations and territorially-
based resources.  Whether we view this through the lens of North’s (1981) property rights 
framework or through Tilly’s (1985) war-centered account of the development of the state, it is 
clear that coercion, and even the possibility of coercion, with neighboring states has been 
paramount to the revenue generating abilities and possibilities for states.  Thies’s work on 
interstate rivalry (most of which are territorial in nature and occur between neighbors), has 
previously demonstrated that it forms a kind of coercive threat that allows for states to increase 
their tax revenues.  We therefore consider interstate rivalry as a form of “direct” coercion that 
should allow states to increase their revenues.  Simmons et al. (2006: 790) refer to this type of 
intentional interaction among states as “direct” coercion because it is active and intentional. We 
also consider territorial contiguity as a more passive conduit for coercion, or what Simmons et al. 
(2006: 791) refer to as “soft” coercion.  Geographic space, a mainstay in the spatial literature, 
should also have strong positive effects on revenue extraction within states. Gibler’s (2012) work 
                                               
4 Maggetti and Gilardi (Forthcoming) note that the operational indicators used to represent 
conceptual mechanisms vary across studies with no single measurement approach dominating across 
any of the mechanisms we examine.  We follow their advice and try to match our operational 
indictors as closely as possible to the way we believe the mechanism operates in the diffusion of state 
fiscal capacity. 
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on territory and state development, and even Shin and Ward’s (1999) work on the spatial 
clustering of defense spending all point to strong geographic spatial effects for state fiscal 
capacity.  Innovations in revenue generation in neighboring states should diffuse quickly, 
especially in regions with histories of conflict, as the “policies of powerful governments often 
constitute focal points” for interdependent domestic policy choices (Simmons et al., 2006: 791).  
Thus, the more direct form of coercion is represented by interstate rivalry, while the more soft 
form of coercion is represented by territorial contiguity. 
 The next mechanism we suggest is important in diffusing information about appropriate 
extraction is competition, which we believe will be channeled primarily through trade networks.  
As Simmons et al. (2006: 792) note, competition between governments over export-market 
shares, including arguments about diffusion of regulatory environments and tax competition as 
described above are mainstays of the literature.  Trade taxation meets Simmons et al.’s (2006: 
792-793) standards to make an argument about competition, since tax policy affects the “flow of 
international production and… the attractiveness of a nation’s exports,” changes in taxation will 
have “consequential effects in the short- to medium-term,” and occur in an “information-rich (in 
fact, close to perfect) environment.”  MNCs engaged in trade assist with the information-rich 
environment.  As Lazer (2005: 56) notes, “corporate entities have interests that enter the political 
calculus in the countries that they exist in (very often pushing for compatible cross-national 
standards) but, furthermore, also serve as (nonneutral) vessels for policy information.” 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) will push for harmonious regulations, including tax policy.  
Consultants like Accenture, as well as law firms operating international also serve as conduits of 
information about “lessons from one jurisdiction” at the same time that they are trying to 
“capture some of the potential gains in other jurisdictions as rents” (Lazer 2005: 56).  State 
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officials will be subjected to lobbying activities by MNCs, law firms, consultants, as well as 
NGOs who may oppose their rent-seeking, as to what are competitive and appropriate levels of 
taxation as well as agreements on rents derived from jointly owned or managed natural 
resources. Further, Simmons et al. (2006: 794) argue that diffusion via competition will be much 
more pronounced among countries located in the same trade network.  We therefore 
operationalize the mechanism of competition with a measure of a state’s bilateral trade to 
account for the relative importance of trade to each state.
5
 
 Next, we look at the mechanism of learning that operates through international 
organizations (IGOs). According to Simmons et al. (2006: 795), learning “refers to a change in 
beliefs or a change in one’s confidence in existing beliefs, which can result from exposure to 
new evidence, theories, or behavioral repertoires.”  Innovation in tax revenue generation should 
result from the diffusion of “a shared fund of (often technical) knowledge among elites about 
what is effective…fostered by…shared norms, beliefs, and notions of evidentiary validity” 
(Simmons et al., 2006: 795).  Simmons et al. (2006: 798) specifically suggest that international 
institutions are a “natural conduit for learning and, especially, for organized pedagogy.” Lazer 
                                               
5 Trade relationships may stimulate diffusion in several ways. In this paper, we theorize that 
economic and political elites mimic the practices of their most important trade partners, and hence, 
measure trade connectivity as total bilateral trade volumes. From a tax extraction perspective, states 
care where and whether international trading firms are paying appropriate dues. The best way to 
ensure compliance with domestic tax law and prevent tax evasion is to close loopholes, or compare 
notes, with its largest trade partners.  An alternative way to think of diffusion through trade, not 
explored here, is that states mimic the policies of those states that are most similar to them in terms 
of the portfolio of the trading goods: i.e. states that sell the same goods to the same buyers are in 
direct competition, which leads to policy convergence. Some scholars have attempted to capture such 
competition by calculating network similarity measures (e.g., structural equivalence scores) on 
bilateral trade flows (Cao and Prakash 2010). Trade structural equivalence measure, however, may 
conflate states that compete for the same markets with states that are part of the same supply chain 
(i.e. two states sell complementary goods to the same buyers). Chatagnier and Kavakli (2014) 
propose a more nuanced measure of trade portfolio similarity, by calculating states’ similarity in 
terms of the types of goods being sold rather than mere volumes. We argue that, while valid, this 
causal mechanism is less applicable to the subject of tax extraction. 
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(2005: 57) highlights the role that IGOs often play with respect to the dissemination of 
information about regulatory policy. He used the OECD series of studies about regulatory reform 
in the 1990s to illustrate how this IGO developed a series of regulatory reform regulations that 
came to be widely agreed to as being appropriate (see also Breul 1996). The OECD played a 
critical role in the diffusion process by defining the menu of policy options, providing evaluation 
of those options by aggregating the experiences of multiple states, and providing exemplars to 
model appropriate behavior.  According to Lazer (2005), the OECD also increased confidence in 
these beliefs by providing “a cover of legitimacy (normative isomorphism—see DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983) to policy makers seeking policy options and reduced uncertainty regarding the 
consequences from any particular option.”  IGOs can thus provide specific policies that ought to 
be implemented, in part, because membership in their organization ensures that others are also 
acting similarly based on shared beliefs about which policies produce the best outcomes.  A 
number of IGOs work on issues specifically related to capacity building.  For example, the 
World Bank’s project on Governance and Public Sector Management includes specific policy 
advice on tax policy and revenue administration. We operationalize the learning mechanism 
through membership in economic IGOs, since they are the most likely to disseminate 
information that states may learn from about appropriate tax revenue generating policies. 
 Finally, emulation is the last mechanism we examine as a function of political space and 
more specifically, regime type.  Emulation, according to Simmons et al. (2006: 799) involves the 
adoption of a “best practice” in an area of policy based not on evidence nor shared beliefs, but on 
who had previously adopted a policy.  The reference group is key for emulation, since this is 
what distinguishes it from learning.  In the learning mechanism, states change their beliefs or 
increase confidence in their beliefs based on their participation with each other in an 
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international organization that coordinates the dissemination of information about policy.  The 
emulation mechanism involves a self-comparison to a reference group based on a shared social 
type, which for the case of tax revenue generation, we suggest is regime type.  Since the default 
regime type for states since their earliest formation has been autocracy, it stands to reason that 
once a transition occurs and a democracy is established that its rulers would look to other 
democracies as models for their policies.  Since the legitimacy of the bargain over taxation 
between rulers and ruled in a democracy is critical for the survival of elected leaders in office as 
well as the maintenance of democracy itself, rather than simply rely on untested notions of what 
constitutes a legitimate fiscal contract it makes sense that other models used by democracies 
would be adapted (Timmons 2005).  Campbell’s (1992, 1993, 1994) work on taxation policy in 
the newly democratized Central and Eastern European states showed a great deal of isomorphism 
as states emulated Western European democracies after the transition.  We would expect such 
emulation to continue as the taxation policies of successful democracies are emulated by 
followers.  We would similarly expect that successful autocracies would emulate each other’s 
revenue generating policies.  For example, the need for revenue has led many autocrats to cut 
deals with multinational corporations to search for natural resource wealth as a way to reduce 
their need to extract from societal actors and reward those in their selectorate (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2005).  Other autocrats have emulated a relaxed attitude toward remittances, as 
they are a source of foreign currency and revenues. 
 We therefore expect that interstate rivalry and territorial contiguity operating through the 
mechanism of coercion, trade operating through the mechanism of competition, IGO 
membership operating through the mechanism of learning, and regime type operating through 
the mechanism of emulation will all have significant, positive effects on state fiscal capacity.  
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While previous research into revenue extraction may have considered some of these factors, it 
has primarily done so without truly modeling the interconnectedness of each state in the 
international system.  We believe there are strong reasons to suspect that considering geographic, 
trade, and several forms of political space (regime type and IGO membership) will allow us to 
uncover the true nature of international effects on domestic revenue extraction. 
 We assume, consistent with predatory theory, that states prefer to maximize their 
revenues subject to constraints.  Thus the effects on revenue from these various diffusion 
mechanisms are all presumed to be positive. Predatory theory expects that once increases in 
revenue generation occur, they tend to be sticky—or subject to a “ratchet effect” or 
“displacement effect” (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961; Rasler and Thompson, 1985).  According to 
this argument, once an increase in tax revenue is achieved by the ruler, especially as a result of 
war, it is seldom allowed to return to the pre-war level.  In general then, we expect that 
innovations in extraction will lead to increased revenue extraction. 
 
Data and Methods 
 We test the competing causal mechanisms using an m-STAR model which is able to 
capture the spatial effects of interstate rivalry, geographic contiguity, trade, membership in 
economic IGOS, and regime similarity using spatial lags (Franzese and Hays 2008; Hays, Kachi, 
and Franzese 2010). The model accounts for spatial dependence by including a lagged dependent 
variable on the right hand side of the equation, taking the form: 
  (1) 
  (2) 
     y Wy Vy X
1
R
r r
r


W W
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where y is a vector of the dependent variable, ρr are coefficients on spatial lags, Wr are NT x NT 
matrices whose elements represent the weighted relationship between i and j, φ is the coefficient 
on the first-order temporal lag Vy, V is an NT x NT matrix with 1’s on the minor diagonal and 
zeros elsewhere, X is an NT matrix of k exogenous state-level covariates, β is a vector of 
coefficients, and while ε is a vector representing random error. Spatial autocorrelation is 
accounted for by the disturbance in the lagged dependent variable weighted by the connectivity 
matrices (contiguity, rivalry, trade, joint memberships in economic IGOs, and regime similarity), 
while temporal autocorrelation is captured by the lagged dependent variable.  
 The effect of geographical diffusion on state i’s tax extraction, , for instance, is 
modeled as a parameter on the average tax ratio of state i’s contiguous geographic neighbors, by 
multiplying the geographical contiguity matrix  by a vector of the dependent variable 
values y. Thus, Tunisia’s tax extraction, for example, is modeled as a function, in part, of the 
average tax extraction of Tunisia’s geographical neighbors of Libya and Algeria, while Libya’s 
tax extraction, in turn, is a function of the average tax extraction of Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria, 
Chad, Sudan, and Egypt. Notably, the model allows for indirect spatial effects: Tunisia’s tax 
extraction is also indirectly a function of it’s neighbors’ neighbors, i.e. Egypt’s tax extraction 
affects Tunisia through Libya, and vice versa.  Finally, Tunisia’s tax extraction is also a function 
of its own tax extraction, directly through a temporal lag, and indirectly through the feedback 
loop, in which Tunisia affects its neighbors, who then affect Tunisia back. The effect 
reverberates through these feedback loops, decreasing with magnitude over time and with 
distance in the spatial connectivity matrix, until the system reaches equilibrium. The spatial 
connectivity matrices, in other words, operate as a straightforward way to capture state i’s 
dependence on the outcomes of other states: i.e. how sensitive a state is to interdependence (for a 
contig
contigW
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more in-depth discussion of the model, see Anselin 2003; Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006; 
Franzese and Hays 2007b, 2008; Hays, Kachi, Franzese 2010).  
 We include 137 countries in our analysis from 1960 to 1999, yielding 4098 non-missing 
observations. The dependent variable represents a state’s fiscal capacity and is consistent with 
the predatory state theory used here. We measure fiscal capacity as tax ratio, which is a state’s 
tax revenue as a percent of GDP. This measure reflects the ability of the state to extract resources 
from its citizens. The tax ratio is obviously a rough proxy for state fiscal capacity.  It is the only 
measure for which data is available for a large number of countries.  Data reflecting the 
composition of the tax ratio is incomplete—especially for developing countries.  Ideally, we 
would assess predatory theory using data on direct taxes, as the theoretical expectation is that 
individuals bargain with the ruler over their payment for protection.  Unfortunately, this data is 
just not available for most countries.  The total tax take represented by the tax ratio is often the 
only available measure, and has become the standard in the predatory theory literature (Campbell 
1993; Cheibub 1998; Thies 2005, 2010). 
 Our primary independent variables represent the causal mechanisms by which external 
factors influence state’s tax extraction capabilities: coercion, competition, learning, and 
emulation. These are operationalized as interstate rivalry and territorial contiguity (direct and 
soft coercion), trade networks (competition), shared economic IGO membership (learning), and 
political regime similarity (emulation). We treat each of these variables as a spatial lag in order 
to appropriately test their theorized effects. This means, for example, that each spatial variable is 
an N x N matrix whose cells represent the number of shared economic IGO memberships 
between states i and j. 
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 Territorial contiguity is measured as a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates that states 
share a land border and 0 otherwise. Rivalry is measured using the enduring rivalry variable, 
taken from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006). According to the dichotomous coding of this 
variable, rivalry is an ongoing, conflictual bilateral relationship that includes at least six 
militarized disputes over at least a twenty year period. Trade is measured as bilateral trade flows 
between two countries and is obtained from Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2008). Joint 
membership in an economic IGO is treated as a binary variable, which is coded as 1 if both states 
are members and 0 otherwise. IGO membership data is obtained from Pevehouse, Nordstrom and 
Warnke (2004) and IGO type from Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004). Each of these 
variables is row standardized, giving greater weight to states with which state i interacts more 
frequently (Plümper and Neumayer 2010). Lastly, in order to provide a realistic test of the 
emulation mechanism, we disaggregate regime similarity into 7 categories. Recent work 
demonstrates substantial variation among regimes that is not captured using blunt coding 
instruments, such as whether a state is a democracy or not (Chyzh 2014; Lai and Slater 2006). 
We use Banks (2011) and Polity (Marshall and Jaggers 2008) to construct two types of 
democracy—presidential and parliamentary—and 4 types of autocracy—monarchy, military, 
single-party, and personalist dictatorships, and other.
6
 Political regime similarity is coded as a 1 
if two states share the same regime type, and as a 0 if they do not or are coded as other. 
                                               
6 We treat a state as democratic if it has a score of 7 or greater on the Polity2 variable of the Polity IV 
dataset. To separate democracies into presidential or parliamentary, we rely on Banks’ measure of 
whether a president or member of the legislature operates as the head of government. Autocracies are 
coded using Banks’ measure of whether they are ruled by a monarch, the military, or are a 
dictatorship. We further separate dictatorships into single-party when the regime scores 3 or greater 
on the Executive Constraints variable of the Polity IV dataset, and personalist otherwise (Lai and 
Slater 2006). Lastly, when a state does not fit into any of the previous categories, they are coded as 
other. 
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 In order to test for inter-state diffusion, we must isolate or control for the alternative 
causes of spatial clustering, such as common exposure—similar unit-level response to the same 
stimuli—and homophily—self-selection by similar units into similar treatments (Hays, Kachi, 
and Franzese 2010). We account for common exposure by (1) including a number of monadic 
state-level variables that are typically used to explain a state’s capacity for tax extraction, (2) by 
estimating a model with country fixed effects, (3) and capturing temporal clustering by including 
a lagged dependent variable and an annual control for global oil prices.   
 We include a number of monadic state-level variables that are typically used to explain a 
state’s capacity for tax extraction, which are gathered from Thies (2010). Each variable is 
obtained from Fearon and Laitin (2003) unless otherwise noted. Trade Openness measures a 
state’s imports and exports as a percent of GDP. Civil War is coded as a 1 if a state is currently 
engaged in a civil war and 0 otherwise. Debt measures the amount of guaranteed government 
debt that a state has as a percent of GDP. Inflation is the log of price deflator for GDP. 
Agriculture is measured as agriculture value added as a percent of GDP. Foreign Aid is official 
development assistance that a state receives as a percent of GDP. Federalism is a dichotomous 
variable that is 1 when a state’s subnational units have extensive taxing, spending, or regulatory 
authority (Beck et al 2001). Income/Capita is measured in thousands of 1985 US dollars. Ethnic 
and religious fractionalization is the probability that 2 randomly chosen individuals within a 
state belong to different ethnic-linguistic or religious groups. New state is a dichotomous variable 
coded as 1 if a state is in its first or second year of independence. Instability is a binary measure 
which is coded as 1 if a state experiences a change of 3 or more in its polity score within the last 
3 years. Oil is coded as 1 if a state receives 1/3 of its export revenues from oil and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, in contrast to Thies (2010), we include each of the regime types described above, using 
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parliamentary democracy as the reference group. We include these as they are constitutive parts 
of the regime similarity measure. Moreover, including a more refined measure of regime type 
may help uncover why previous studies of state capacity and democracy have produced mixed 
results. 
 Country fixed effects are a more stringent tool to separate spatial diffusion from 
domestic-level sources of spatial clustering on the dependent variable.  In particular, country 
dummy variables help capture possible unobservable similarities, such as culture, that may also 
be highly correlated with geographical proximity or other of our primary independent variables.  
Despite the strong leverage of controlling for country-level sources for spatial clustering, the 
obvious disadvantage of using country fixed effects is in the resulting limitations on cross-
sectional inference:  by “dummying out” individual countries, fixed effects also discard from the 
analysis any observations with no temporal variation in the domestic-level variables (Beck and 
Katz 2001).  This may be particular problematic for drawing inferences regarding institutional 
variables, such as regime type and federalism, that tend to exhibit high degrees of stability. 
Therefore, while our primary empirical models include country fixed effects, we also include a 
specification without fixed effects. 
 Finally, we account for the temporal dependence in our data in two ways.  We model 
temporal shocks by controlling for global annual oil prices, measured as price per barrel of crude 
oil, in 2009 USD. In addition, we model temporal clustering, or over-time continuity in the levels 
of tax extraction, by including a 1-year temporal lag of the dependent variable.  While not a 
perfect solution, temporal lag also helps account for homophily or the possibility that countries 
with similar tax extraction policies tend to join similar economic IGOs, trade with one another, 
or even build similar domestic regime institutions.  While self-selection presumes policy  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. 
DV: Tax Ratio  0.157   0.087   0.002   1.185   4098 
Trade Openness                 0.629   0.419   0.008   4.253   4098 
Civil War                       0.167   0.373   0   1   4098 
Debt                            0.289   0.486   0   8.234   4098 
Inflation                       0.148   0.336   -0.345   5.593   4098 
Agriculture              0.214   0.164   0.002   0.78   4098 
Foreign Aid                     0.054   0.135   -0.012   2.783   4098 
Federalism                      0.169   0.375   0   1   4098 
Income/cap.                        0.884   1.074   -1.537   3.951   4098 
Ethnic Fract.                   0.412   0.29   0.004   0.925   4098 
Relig. Fract.                   0.366   0.22   0   0.783   4098 
New State                       0.008   0.087   0   1   4098 
Instability                     0.147   0.355   0   1   4098 
Oil                             0.142   0.349   0   1   4098 
Presidential Dem.               0.123   0.328   0   1   4098 
Monarchy                        0.063   0.243   0   1   4098 
Military Regime                 0.169   0.375   0   1   4098 
Single-party Regime            0.231   0.422   0   1   4098 
Personalist Regime             0.134   0.34   0   1   4098 
Other Regime                    0.046   0.209   0   1   4098 
Global Oil Price  34.84   23.369   9.94   95.89   4098 
Spatial Weights      
Contiguity  0.008   0.061   0   1 442080 
Rivalry  0.003   0.048   0   1 442080 
Regime Similarity  0.009   0.021   0   0.333 442080 
Trade  0.009   0.039   0   1 442080 
Economic IGOs  0.009   0.004   0   0.045 442080 
 
continuity among already similar units (i.e. states with high tax extraction self-select in the same 
economic IGOs), controlling for last year’s tax extraction helps model this continuity, ensuring 
that our resulting inferences capture fluctuations in tax revenues (i.e. states that self-selected into  
the same economic IGOs also exhibit similar fluctuations in tax revenues), rather than their 
continuity.
7
 Summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
                                               
7 For similar approaches to capturing homophily, see Hays, Kachi, and Franzese (2010) and Pevehouse (2002). 
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Empirical Analysis 
 The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Table 2. To get a closer look at the 
spatial dynamics posited in the theory, we first estimate a series of models (Models 1-5) that 
include the spatially lagged dependent variables one by one (along with the control variables and 
country fixed effects).
8
 We then run a combined model including all five spatial lags (Model 6). 
Finally, we include a full model without country fixed effects (Model 7). It is important to note 
that the coefficients on spatial lags represent the instantaneous, pre-dynamic effects (i.e., the 
effects in the absence of spatio-temporal feedback) (Franzese and Hays 2007b). The dynamic 
effects created by the “feedback loops” of the spatial and temporal lags are explored using 
counterfactuals and simulation methods following the discussion of the initial results.
9
 
 In order to evaluate our causal mechanisms, we need to look at the top part of the table 
that displays the temporal and spatial lags. First, the temporally lagged dependent variable is 
always positive and statistically significant. This suggests high levels of path dependency within 
the data, i.e. the rates of tax extraction in the previous year are positively correlated with the rates 
in the current year. This result provides face validity to the empirical analysis, highlighting the 
expected trend.  The result is also important, because it means that spatial effects will re-enter the 
equation through the temporal lag, exercising a continuing effect on the dependent variable even 
after the initial time period. This effect will become more evident, as we present and discuss the 
predicted marginal effects graphs.  
 Second, in the first five models of Table 2, each of the spatial lags, with the exception of 
trade, is positive and statistically significant. In the combined model with country fixed effects,  
                                               
8 Country fixed effects are included to account for unit-level heterogeneity. Estimates from each spatio-temporal 
model are stationary (φ + ρ < 1). 
9 Simulations are an alternative tool to the delta method for examining dynamic spatial feedback among units. With 
sufficient iterations, simulations provide more precise results than the delta method. 
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Table 2. Multi-parametric Spatio-Temporal Autoregression on Tax Ratio, 1960-1999.  
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Temporal Lag                 0.744***    0.749***    0.749***    0.747***    0.747***    0.743***    0.881*** 
                                (0.010)     (0.010)     (0.010)     (0.010)     (0.010)    (0.010)  (0.007)    
Contiguity Spatial Lag    0.047*** 
   
    0.039***    0.026*** 
                                (0.012)    
   
 (0.012)  (0.007)    
Rivalry Spatial Lag                 0.021*                                       0.014    0.006    
                                            (0.011)                                        (0.011)  (0.007)    
Trade Spatial Lag                            0.002                            -0.018   0.028    
                                                        (0.028)                            (0.029)  (0.019) 
Econ. IGOs Spatial Lag                                         0.045***                0.030*      0.024    
                                                                    (0.015)                (0.016)  (0.015)    
Regime Similarity                                                      0.050*   0.016 -0.024 
 Spatial Lag                                                                               (0.028)    (0.030)  (0.030)    
Trade Openness                   0.008**     0.008**     0.008**     0.008**     0.008**     0.008**     0.004**  
                                (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.002)    
Civil War                         0.001       0.001       0.001       0.001       0.001    0.001   -0.002    
                                (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.002)    
Debt                              0.001       0.001       0.001       0.001       0.001    0.001   -0.001    
                                (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.001)    
Inflation                         0.005**     0.004**     0.004**     0.004**     0.004**     0.004**     0.002    
                                (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.002)    
Agricultural Dev.                -0.036***   -0.037***   -0.037***   -0.034***   -0.035***   -0.035***   -0.031*** 
                                (0.012)     (0.012)     (0.012)     (0.012)     (0.012)    (0.012)  (0.007)    
Foreign Aid                      -0.061***   -0.060***   -0.060***   -0.061***   -0.060***   -0.062***   -0.023*** 
                                (0.007)     (0.007)     (0.007)     (0.007)     (0.007)    (0.007)  (0.005)    
Federalism                       -0.002      -0.001      -0.001      -0.001      -0.001    -0.001   -0.003    
                                (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.002)    
GDP/cap.                          0.001       0.002       0.002      -0.001       0.001    0.001   -0.005*** 
                                (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.001)    
Ethnic Fract.                     0.037       0.033       0.032       0.030       0.033    0.035   -0.001    
                                (0.053)     (0.053)     (0.053)     (0.053)     (0.052)    (0.052)  (0.002)    
Relig. Fract.                    -0.060*     -0.048      -0.050      -0.052      -0.051    -0.058    0.004    
                                (0.036)     (0.036)     (0.036)     (0.036)     (0.036)    (0.036)  (0.003)    
New State                        -0.007      -0.009      -0.009      -0.006      -0.008    -0.006    0.002    
                                (0.006)     (0.006)     (0.006)     (0.006)     (0.006)    (0.006)  (0.006)    
Instability                       0.002       0.002       0.002       0.002       0.002    0.002    0.001    
                                (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.002)    
Oil                              -0.012***   -0.012***   -0.012***   -0.012***   -0.012***   -0.012***   -0.001    
                                (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.002)    
Presidential Dem.                0.005       0.005       0.005       0.004       0.007    0.006   -0.005**  
                                (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.002)    
Monarchy                         -0.007      -0.007      -0.007      -0.007      -0.006    -0.007   -0.007**  
                                (0.008)     (0.008)     (0.008)     (0.008)     (0.008)    (0.008)  (0.003)    
Military Regime                  0.003       0.002       0.003       0.002       0.005    0.003   -0.007*** 
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                                (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.003)    
Single-party Regime             0.003       0.002       0.003       0.003       0.004    0.004   -0.004**  
                                (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.002)    
Personalist Regime             -0.001      -0.002      -0.002      -0.002       0.001    -0.001   -0.007*** 
                                (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.003)    
Other Regime                     -0.001      -0.002      -0.002      -0.001       0.007    0.002   -0.012**  
                                (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.007)    (0.007)  (0.006)    
Global Oil Price                  0.001       0.001*      0.001*      0.001       0.001    0.001    0.001    
                                (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)    
Constant                         0.035***    0.036***    0.037***    0.036***    0.030***    0.034***    0.025*** 
                                (0.009)     (0.009)     (0.010)     (0.009)     (0.010)    (0.011)  (0.006)    
Sigma                          0.033***    0.033***    0.033***    0.033***    0.033***    0.033***    0.035*** 
                                (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)    
Log-Likelihood                             8186.632    8180.480    8178.700    8183.203    8180.280    8190.141 7982.468    
Observations                              4098    4098    4098    4098    4098    4098 4098    
Countries 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients reported with standard error in parentheses. Fixed effects coefficients 
are suppressed.  
 
however, only contiguity and economic IGOs are positive and statistically significant. Lastly, in 
the model without country fixed effects, only contiguity is positive and statistically significant. 
The differences in statistical significance between the models suggest over-lap and a degree of 
substitutability among the spatial connectivity matrices, even despite the mathematically low 
correlations among them.
 10
 Each spatial lag included in isolation may be picking up the effects 
of the other, omitted spatial lags. Theoretically, this suggests that the five types of international 
connectivity explored here may act in a complementary manner.  
 The statistically significant coefficient on contiguity is consistent with the expectations of 
the soft coercion hypothesis: states converge in their level of fiscal capacity, as a result of the 
latent competition (military or other) with their geographical neighbors.  The statistically 
significant effect on economic IGOs in Models 4 and 6 also provides some support for the 
learning mechanism, which postulates that governments both share and acquire important 
                                               
10 The spatial weights matrices are not highly correlated, the highest and the only correlation that is greater than 
0.2--between contiguity and rivalry--is  r=0.27. 
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information on tax policy innovations through IGOs, either directly (IGOs serve as teachers of 
policy innovations) or indirectly, from IGO-facilitated interaction with elites from more fiscally 
successful states. Neither rivalry, regime similarity, nor trade is statistically significant, once 
other forms of interdependence are accounted for. That is, there is no support for the competition 
and emulation mechanisms.  
 Turning to the monadic variables in the bottom half of the table, it is worth noting that the 
control variables replicate the existing literature. Trade openness and inflation are positive and 
statistically significant across all models, while Agricultural development, foreign aid, and oil 
are negative and statistically significant across all models. Interestingly, global oil price, the 
variable capturing common shocks, is statistically insignificant. This result suggests that 
common shocks exert little additional impact on a state’s extractive capacity (beyond that 
already captured in the model, as a result of standardizing the dependent variable by GDP). 
 One important point to discuss here is, however, the disaggregated effect of regime type. 
Model 7, the model without country fixed effects, shows that the effects of all regimes (including 
presidential democracies) are negative and significant compared to parliamentary democracies. 
Moreover, post-estimation Wald chi-square tests reveal that there is no statistical difference 
between any of the other groups, including between presidential democracies and any of the 
autocracies. This is consistent with the comparative literature, which often notes that presidential 
democracies act similar to autocracies (e.g., Linz 1990; O’Donnell 1994). This result suggests 
that parliamentary democracies drive the positive effect associated with democracy in previous 
work and highlights the importance of using a more refined theoretical and conceptual definition 
of regime type. Note that the regime effects are no longer statistically significant in models 1-6, 
which include country fixed effects. This is easily explained, as the low levels of regime 
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variation within countries makes regime type highly correlated with country effects (Beck and 
Katz 2001; Plümper and Troeger 2007). 
 An advantage of our estimation approach is that it permits investigation of spatio-
temporal feedback dynamics. The spatial variables enter the model as the coefficients on the 
average effects of state i’s geopolitical neighbors’ values on the dependent variable. This means 
that the spatial lags operate as feedback loops that channel the effect of the states that state i is 
connected to, exhibiting non-linear effects on the dependent variable.  
 In order to assess the overall effect of the spatial lags, we construct two separate 
counterfactuals.  In each of the counterfactuals, we select a suitable country and shock one of its 
independent variables, while holding all other variables at the values they exhibited in the last 
year for which the data is available.  We then calculate the difference between the predicted 
value of the dependent variable between the counterfactuals with and without a shock.  This 
allows us to explore the cumulative effects of such shocks on spatial dynamics: (1) the direct 
effects transmitted via a state’s own connectivities, as well as (2) the indirect effects channeled 
through the connectivities of the second degree and beyond. 
 For the first counterfactual we give a permanent $20 billion (1 standard deviation) 
decrease to Turkey in agriculture/GDP.
 Without changing Turkey’s GDP, this reduction 
represents an increase in economic development, as greater levels of agriculture as a percent of 
GDP are associated with lower levels of industrialization and economic development (Gollins, 
Parente, and Rogerson 2002). We selected Turkey as the counterfactual country because it has an 
abnormally high level of agriculture/GDP compared to neighboring states, which means that a 
$20 billion change would not be altogether surprising.  Moreover, the 1 standard deviation  
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Figure 1. Predicted Long-Term Cumulative Changes in Tax Revenue, Resulting from a 1 s.d. 
Counterfactual Shock to Economic Development (decrease in Agriculture) in Turkey. 
 
change is panel specific to Turkey, meaning that Turkey has undergone similar variation within 
the sample.  
 Using a spatio-temporal approach, we can calculate the predicted cumulative long run 
effect of this shock on Turkey, as well as the effects on its neighbors, such as Greece and Syria, 
via the feedback mechanisms, over a 20 year period (see Figure 1). In Figure 1, greater increases 
in tax ratio, in response to the shock to Turkey, are represented by darker shades of gray. The 20 
year period roughly corresponds to the point in time when the effect from the initial shock 
returns to its long run steady state, or long run equilibrium. Note that one can think of the 
predicted cumulative long run effects in terms of the best responses or optimal policy outcome in 
neighboring states, given the permanent change in Turkey (Franzese and Hays 2008: 746). 
 In accordance with the estimates of our model (Model 6), this shock leads to a rather 
large increase in Turkey’s tax revenue (tax ratio)--a $2.78 billion (1.11 percentage points) 
Change in Tax Ratio
Turkey
Moderate
Small
Negative
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increase over the twenty year period.  Note, that as a result of the feedback loops described 
above, the increase for Turkey also includes its own response to the changes it caused in its 
neighboring states, as the shock reverberates back and forth through a network of states. As 
shown in Figure 1, the shock also leads to changes in a number of other states, connected to 
Turkey.  Greece and Syria, contiguous neighbors of Turkey, increase their tax revenue (tax ratio) 
by $55 million (0.046 percentage points) and $8.3 million (0.044 percentage points), 
respectfully.  Interestingly, even states that are geographically distance are impacted through the 
other forms of political space. This is evident by Australia, which shares 14 economic IGOs with 
Turkey, experiencing a $18.8 million (0.005 percentage point) increase in tax revenue (tax ratio). 
 On the theoretical level, we can think of a negative shock to Turkey’s agricultural 
production, holding GDP constant, as leading to an improvement in Turkey’s tax extraction (e.g., 
it is easier for government to tax industries than agricultural areas, because of more professional 
accounting, higher spatial concentration in the cities, etc.).  Improvements in Turkey’s tax 
revenues, in turn, affect its neighbors, who do not want to fall too far behind, owing to the 
competition induced via (soft) coercion.  An improvement in Turkey’s tax extraction similarly 
affects other states with whom Turkey comes in frequent interaction on the international level 
(e.g., its economic IGO partners).  States, whose elites interact with those of Turkey through 
international economic IGOs, are more likely to adopt or mimic successful policies from Turkey, 
because frequent interaction keeps them up to date on Turkey’s economic policies and progress. 
This effect is larger for states with larger over-laps in economic IGO memberships.  Policy 
changes in Turkey, for example, exert more influence on Australia, who shares 14 of its 1133 
joint IO memberships with Turkey, than on more geographically proximate states, such as  
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Figure 2. Spatio-Temporal Effects on Tax Ratio in Greece from a 1 s.d. Counterfactual Shock to 
Economic Development (decrease in Agriculture) in Turkey. 
 
 
Germany (16/1398) and France (18/1558).
11
 That is, Turkey carries more relative weight for 
policies related to tax extraction for Australia than it does for either Germany or France. 
 To further illustrate, Figure 2 presents the changing temporal effect of this shock to 
Turkey on Greece. The y-axis represents the change in Greece’s tax ratio, or its extractive 
capabilities, from the previous year given the shock to Turkey, while the x-axis represents the 
number of years since the initial shock. Since GDP is held constant in this illustration, this 
                                               
11 The number of joint IGO memberships between two states is the total number of IGOs, in which both states are 
members partners. For example, according to the Correlates of War IGO dataset, Australia has 131 joint IGO 
memberships through the WTO in 1999, for example, one of which is with Turkey. Overall, Australia has a total of 
1133 joint economic IGO memberships with all states in the dataset, 14 of which are with Turkey. Since Economic 
IGOs is row standardized in the analysis, the measure captures weighted influence of the number of shared 
memberships of i and j  as a proportion of i’s total number of shared memberships. 
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increase can be attributed solely to tax extraction.
12
  We can see that the shock produces a 
relatively large initial effect which increases in the first three time periods before moderating and 
gradually decreasing back to zero, or reaching the long run equilibrium. The cumulative effect of 
these changes, of course, results in the aforementioned permanent 0.046 percent point increase in 
Greece’s tax ratio. While relatively small, it is important to keep in mind that this change is the 
isolated effect of the spatio-temporal feedback from the shock to just one neighboring country. 
 In the second counterfactual, we investigate the effects of a permanent $50 million 
(13.6%) increase in foreign aid to Tunisia, which translates into a 2.427 percentage point 
increase in the amount of its foreign aid as a percent of GDP. We select Tunisia because it is the 
state whose democratization initiated the Arab Spring in 2011, triggering an increase in foreign 
assistance from the US and other donors. This, as well as the continued instability within the 
region, makes Tunisia a suitable choice for our counterfactual example. 
 We again calculate the predicted cumulative long run effect of this shock on Tunisia, as 
well as a sample of its neighbors, over a 20 year period (see Figure 3). In Figure 3, darker shades 
represent states that have undergone the largest decrease in tax revenue (tax ratio) in response to 
the shock to Tunisia. As was the case in the previous example, the 20 years reflects the 
approximate amount of time before the effect of the initial shock dissipates, and tax ratio returns 
to its long run steady state. Tunisia experiences a $12 million (0.058 percentage point) decrease 
in tax revenue (tax ratio), while its contiguous neighbors, Algeria and Libya suffer a $3.8 million 
(0.007 percentage point) and $2.7 million (0.006 percentage point) drop, accordingly. As was the 
case with Turkey, Tunisia experiences both direct and indirect effects from the initial shock, as it 
responds to the changes in its neighboring states as the shock feeds back through the network of  
                                               
12 All economic variables in the model are standardized by GDP; therefore, GDP is held constant in the 
counterfactuals.  
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Figure 3. Predicted Long-Term Cumulative Changes in Tax Revenue, Resulting from a 1 s.d. 
Counterfactual Shock (Increase) to Tunisia’s Foreign Aid. 
 
 
states with whom it share borders and memberships in economic IGOs. Interestingly, this 
example highlights that an effect can be negative, as other states can essentially face less 
pressure in regards to their own extractive practices given the weakening of a neighboring state. 
 Theoretically, a positive shock to Tunisia’s foreign aid also has wide-ranging effects. An 
increase in foreign aid provides additional disposable funds to the Tunisian government, relaxing 
pressure to extract revenue from its population. As a result, the government becomes more 
willing to grant exemptions (or less willing to enforce current tax law) to its constituents.  This 
change in Tunisian tax extraction has implications for other states, especially those with frequent 
interaction with Tunisia (e.g., through economic IGOs).  Investors and traders group these states 
within the same reference category as Tunisia in terms of development or economic risk.  States 
that fall within the same reference category, such as China and Russia, must compete with the  
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Figure 4. Spatio-Temporal Effects on Tax Ratio in Libya from a  
$50 million Counterfactual Shock to Foreign Aid in Tunisia. 
 
 
now more lax Tunisian policies.  Although not its geographical neighbors, both of these states 
are in rather frequent interaction with Tunisia, with China sharing with Tunisia 9 of its total 1166 
joint memberships in economic IGOs, the corresponding number for Russia being 10/1181, and 
only 12/1566 for the more geographically proximate Italy. 
 To better investigate the temporal element of the feedback loop, we examine the effect of 
a shock on Tunisia’s foreign aid on Libya’s extraction capacity in Figure 4. As was the case 
above, we find that the effect of the shock is relatively strong in the first time period, increases in 
periods 2 and 3, before gradually dissipating until it reaches the long run equilibrium and returns 
to zero. 
 Although the raw values of the substantive effects are rather small, it is important to 
remember that they represent just the isolated effects of a relatively small shock on only one 
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covariate in a single country. Such isolated cases of a country undergoing economic development 
are, in reality, quite rare.  The literature shows that economic and political shocks tend to cluster 
in both time and space (e.g., the Asian Tigers, democratic waves), which suggests that the 
observed cumulative effects of these shocks would likely be much larger. 
 
Conclusion 
 We build on the predatory theory of state administrative development by positing and 
exploring several causal mechanisms acting on a state from outside of its borders: coercion, 
competition, learning, and emulation, that operate to channel information through interstate 
rivalries, territorial contiguity, trade networks, and the political space associated with regime 
similarity and IGO membership.  We test our predictions using a multi-parametric spatio-
temporal autoregressive model with five spatial lags capturing the theoretical mechanisms.  We 
find support for the two of the four mechanisms.  First, our empirical results indicate that states 
respond to the policy outcomes in their contiguous neighbors:  a state that finds itself in a 
neighborhood of states with growing fiscal capacity tends to respond by adopting the policies 
that increase its own capacity.  Such geographical clustering of states with similar levels of 
extractive capacity suggests support for the soft form of coercion—our first causal mechanism.  
 Second, we find that states tend to respond to fiscal policy changes of their economic 
IGO partners:  there is a direct relationship between the extractive capacity of states with shared 
membership in economic IGOs. This provides support for the learning mechanism that views the 
role of IGOs as the legitimizers of policy models for their members and the source of 
information regarding the consequences of particular policies.  
37 
 
 Our results also have important policy implications, especially in the area of 
developmental assistance. We show, for example, that exogenous shocks to a state’s 
development, such as an increase in foreign aid, affect more than just the recipient state. 
Operating through feedback loops created by the spatio-temporal lags, these shocks also affect 
countries that are connected to the recipient, either through territorial contiguity or shared IGO 
membership. Our results suggest, therefore, that the spillover effects must be taken into account 
in decisions regarding aid allocation. The potential negative externalities associated with the 
spatial effects of developmental aid may undermine the strategic considerations of the donor. 
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